In the law of art, as in art itself, we innocents often look abroad for tasteful instruction. That process is now taking place with respect to the droit de suite, an interesting addition to the copyright laws of France [I] , Italy [2] and Germany [3], among other nations. Roughly translated as an 'art-proceeds right', the droit de suite is a technique originally designed to furnish artists and sculptors with some portion of the increase in the value of their works when they are resold. Sometimes, as in France, a flat fee is payable to the artist or his heirs on the public resale of all paintings and the fee must be paid whether the painting rises in price or not. In Italy, on the other hand, the artist is entitled to a droit de suite only on the increase in value of the work of art. The techniques used differ with respect to the resales covered (auctions, dealer or private sales), the percentage of the resale price the artist obtains (3 per cent in France, 1 per cent in Germany), the minimum price the object must bring before the mechanism is brought into play at all and the length of time during which the mechanism operates (in the American proposal, life of the artist plus 50 years).
The droit desuite springs from certain assumptions about the relationships between society and its artists, particularly painters and sculptors, and from a belief that the artist does not receive a fair price for his work, The current demand for an art-proceeds right is buttressed by allegations that copyright schemes, including currently proposed revisions, do not provide just compensation for most painters and sculptors as compared with authors. If the assumptions on which the droit de suite is based apply to America, the art-proceeds right may offer a method for remedying the plight of these artists by enabling them to realize a part of the appreciation in value of their work.
I. THE THEOLOGY OF THE

DROIT DE SUITE
To appreciate the concept of the droit de suite and the fervor of those promoting it, the model of society and the artist within it upon which the artproceeds right is based must be understood. A survey of the literature on the droit de suite reveals a deep-seated romantic view of art and the artist that colors most discussion of the beneficial aspects of the statute. A French writer, R. Plaisant, has put it succinctly: 'It is a matter of fact that often artists sell their works for little money and that some years afterward, sometimes after their death, these works are resold for a very high price. To give a participation to the artists or their heirs on this high price is equitable.' The droit desuite springs from a nostalgic recollection of the late nineteenth century. It is a case, not unusual, of legislation passed or posed to correct a situation that no longer exists with the intensity that provoked reform.
The droit de suite evolved from a particular conception of art, the artist and the way art is sold. At its core is a vision of the starving artist, where the purchaser is a canny investor who travels about artists' hovels trying to pick up bargains which he will later turn into large amounts of cash. Thirty years later the artist is still without funds and his children are in rags; meanwhile his paintings, now the subject of a Museum of Modern Art retrospective and a Harry Abrams parlor-table book, fetch small fortunes at Park-Bernet and Christie's. The rhetoric of the droit de suite is an expression of the belief that (1) the sale of the artist's work at anything like its 'true' value only comes late in his life or after his death; (2) the postponement in value is attributable to the lag in popular understanding and appreciation; (3) therefore the artist is subsidizing the public's education with his poverty; (4) this is an unfair state of affairs; (5) the artist should profit when he is finally discovered by the newly sophisticated market.
The accuracy of this conception aside, it is interesting that it is so strongly held and that it so strongly influences attitudes toward legislation. Despite the rewards our society provides those who rebel and innovate, the romantic image of the poor painter continues to dominate public thought. Moreover, this romantic idea is as important to artists as it is to the audience for art. Poverty or its semblance is a uniform which distinguishes the artist from his bourgeois audience. Lack of money is a celebration of sorts. Part of the burden of being a prophet in a philistine society is the burden of being misunderstood and neglected.
It would not be a matter of great concern if this model of behavior and antagonism, of revolt and poverty, existed solely to reinforce opinions that the public had about itself and its worries about taste and judgment. Unfortunately, this perception of the artist can have perverse effects if it is the basis for public policy. The government then concentrates on a perceived but possibly unreal inequity-namely, the lag in market acceptance of artists' works which is thought to occur because artists are always ahead of their times. If this lag is unavoidable, society must do some penance for its thick-headedness; the artist should not support the entire maturing process. The droit de suite is exactly this kind of penance. It is a tax on the second generation for the stupidity of its forefathers. Or, more charitably, the droit de suite assumes that the current generation is as blind to the virtues of contemporary artists as the preceding generation was to its avant-garde. If each group post-pays, then some justice will ensue. Painters still may not get rich while they are painting -that is consonant with the romantic view of creation-but their retirement years will be more secure and their wives and children will have some profit.
THE DROIT D E SUITE IN THE MARKET PLACE
The droit de suite, as developed in Europe, is based on a set of specific assumptions about the relationship between price and 'value' and the kinds of commercial transactions which characterize the market for paintings and sculpture. Therefore, certain aspects of the production and distribution of these art forms in America must be examined to determine the relevance of the droit de suite model on our shores.
A. Style and trend: Their impact on u droit de suite
The usefulness of a droit de suite depends, to a large extent, on the kind of art that is produced and the kind of product the government wants to encourage. It is impossible for the government to be wholly value-free in supporting or not supporting various schools of art. The proposed American act for an art-proceeds right has a ring of neutrality to it; seemingly the market decides where the rewards will be. But this neutral pose betrays a false modesty. To the extent that the droit de suite is effective, it is an incentive to produce work that can and will be resold. It is designed for easel paintings and traditional sorts of sculpture. Indeed, it is impossible to measure the relevance of so important a concept as the droit de suite, or any other techniques, for providing greater economic security for artists without a great deal of information about trends and movements in art. The extent to which an artist (and, when generalized, a whole school or generation of artists) will benefit from the droit de suite depends largely on the kind of work he creates: whether it is monumental sculpture or easel painting, plastic or iron, auto-da-fe or laminated for preservation. It depends as well on the demand profile: the percentage of purchasers who are corporations, museums, young adults with limited incomes or wealthy patrons (who, though limited in number, may support an entire movement). The usefulness of the droit de suite is also a function of how the artist produces his work, how many versions there are, how divorced the conception is from the execution.
The art proceeds right is particularly designed for works of art where the conception is embodied in one object and in that object only. Normally it must be an 'original work of art' meaning, usually, 'a work that is unique such as a painting, sculpture, drawing or illustrated manuscript'. The definition of the qualifying items in the proposed bill (not yet introduced in Congress) defines a work as a 'unique art object' if:
(1) the material object is that in which the work of art was first embodied in finished form; and (2) the work of art embodied in the object has not been lawfully reproduced in any other material object possessing substantially the same physical characteristics.
The value of a droit de suite is changed by shifts in government policy which affect the art market: general income tax increases, the existence of a war, more extensive public higher education. Changes of styles in architecture and landscaping, which create or destroy opportunities for the exhibition of works of art also significantly influence the market. The factors that affect the art market and thus the operation of a droit de suite are so many and so complex that a complete treatment is beyond the scope of this study. It will be useful, however, to look at several important trends in art marketing and to note their effects on an art proceeds mechanism.
I . Drawings, studies and L,ersions. One recent trend in the American art market which affects the relevance of a droit de suite for traditional easel painters and sculptors is the increasing popularity of draniings, studies and oersions. This growth in the sale of preliminary drawings has two implications for a droit de suite. First, it enables the struggling artist to have a more uniform income over the year by capitalizing on the market for works of art from $10 to $300. Second, it provides a technique for cashing in on the increase in value of the principal work or of early major works. Under the droit de suite model, government assistance for the artist is necessary because he is not able to enjoy the future increase in a painting's or sculpture's value. The sale of preliminary sketches and studies may fill this gap. Finally, there is evidence that some painters render versions of successful paintings to gain a present financial reward for works that were once sold cheaply. De Chirico, for example, imitated his own early and more valuable style.
2. Multiples. The droit de suite is particularly designed to protect artists who produce unique works of art like painting and sculpture. It is possible, however, that the concept of an 'original' work itself is misleading and that artists are currently moving away from such concrete and unique embodiments of their creative conception. If fewer and fewer artists rely on something that resembles a masterpiece in oil for their livelihood, then the droit de suite loses significance as a tool for economic reward.
Although the possibility of infinite reproductions which have the integrity of 'originals' was virtually unknown in the past, there are signs that such processes have now assumed some aesthetic importance in their own right. More important from the point of view of the droit de suite is the increasing acceptance by the art world of the industrial practice of separating invention from execution. With the proliferation of industrial techniques adaptable to current aesthetic tendencies, the concept of an 'original' will probably weaken considerably. The 'original' in art, as in architecture, will be a blueprint, a set of sketches and instructions to the craftsman. Of course, the fact that an increasing number of artists may be producing multiple reproductions does not mean that the painter of an original oil should be stripped of art proceeds protection because his oil is not produced in numerous copies like a book. But the necessity for a droit de suite is less pressing if one considers painters and sculptors as a group rather than focusing on particular classes of artists.
3. Scale. Much of the recent work in both painting and sculpture has been of monumental scale. If the artists whom the government wants to foster are creating works several stories high or room-size, then the droit de suite, with its assumption of periodic resale, may be inappropriate or irrelevant. Hilton Kramer recently commented on the 'Scale as Content' show at the Corcoran Museum in Washington, D.C., calling the movement to create sculptures of immense size 'one of the salient features of the current American art scene'. Indeed, there are indications that two of the strongest movements in art at the present time are towards work easily reproducible on the one hand and works of monumental scale on the other, categories for which a droit de suite is either unnecessary or unworkable.
4. Distribution. And the increase in the number of museum and corporate purchasers and in purchases by the government, means that a larger number of paintings will be held indefinitely by single purchasers making a droit de suite inapplicable. With the increasing participation of such institutional purchasers in the art market, the importance of the corner art gallery that exhibits and does some off-the-street business seems to be declining. In its place, there is emerging a type of agent who avoids the overhead costs of a gallery and concentrates his selling talents on a selected list of purchasers, mainly corporations, governmental and private commissions, museums and large collectors. The tendency of artists to produce works of monumental scale reinforces these patterns of distribution; such an artist wilfully rejects a potential market by producing work that is too large or too expensive for the normal clientele of a gallery. Ephemeral works present an analogous problem. If art objects are self-destructive, or made so that they deteriorate rapidly, the market for resale is diminished and the chance of an ephemeral work, in this sense, being resold and producing a droit de suite is nil.
B. The law and the market: Authors, artists and the copyright law The Constitution and copyright laws evidence a public concern that individuals who produce works of art should be encouraged and protected in their efforts. Unfortunately, many believe that the copyright statute was designed and written with authors, not painters or sculptors, in mind. The copyright statute permits the author to reap continuing benefits from the sale of his books so that his prosperity rides with the times: when his book is popular, he is enriched; when sales lag, he can wait. A painter or sculptor, it is commonly thought, has no such luxury. The sale of his painting or sculpture is a single, final event for him ; the copyright mechanism offers him no technique for obtaining the comforts of a continuing financial stake in future sales of his art work. If these arguments are correct, the droite de suite concept is justified because copyright is not at present a useful tool for artists; and as a consequence, federal policy is not even-handed in the support of the creative arts ; therefore, corrective action should be taken.
Because painters and sculptors have not relied on copyright protection, litigation has been rare. As a result, the extent of protection which present law might give them cannot be accurately gauged. Some of the rights which may exist under the copyright law and which would benefit these artists have hardly been touched by them. A few are suggestive.
The right to exhibit. As long as the artist retains ownership and possession of the work itself, he necessarily maintains control over its exhibition. Thus he can loan his work to others for exhibition to the public and can, in certain cases, obtain compensation for this. The copyright law, particularly under the proposed revision, may even provide protection against uncompensated exhibition by the purchaser of the work, if the painter or sculptor has retained the copyright. Under French law, the painter or sculptor has the right to obtain compensation from a blackguard who copies his style or technique, such as the precise color studies of Josef Albers. Such a right is probably more extensive than that which is presently understood as the right against infringement. But the paucity of artists availing themselves of federal copyright protection means there is extremely little in the way ofcase law on infringement and imitation.
The right against transformation and destruction. Another potential but largely untested right of the artist relates to subsequent use of the work. Because the work of art is considered unique and because it is thought that the painter or sculptor must rely on the continued existence and integrity of the work to exploit his other rights, there may be an implicit right in the artist to enjoin the distortion or ruin of his painting or sculpture. Although such a right is recognized in France, there is again little case law to suggest whether it is also recognized in the United States.
Although these unexplored rights under the present copyright law may prove of some benefit to painters and sculptors, they can expect to receive much greater gains from the widely recognized copyright interest in reproductions of their works. The explosion in the sale of silk-screen prints and posters, the new fashion of 'multiples', and the improved techniques for distributing and selling reproductions have established a market for works of art which approximate the market for books printed in limited editions. As art is popularized and as the mass market is nourished and exploited, the reproduction rights for works of art will increase substantially in value. If painters and sculptors, like authors, receive compensation from the proliferation of their work through reproductions, the apparent discrimination of the copyright law in favour of authors and against painters and sculptors will be minimized. example, will widen the artist's opportunity to exploit the market for reproductions; in contrast to prior law, the artist will retain reproduction rights in unpublished works unless he specifically transfers such rights with the sale of the object itself.
Other market place phenomena undercut the easy conclusion that the present copyright scheme discriminates between artists and authors. The author, after all, normally obtains all his income from the royalty on successive sales of 'reproductions' from his manuscript. The artist, on the other hand, usually obtains a lump sum payment for what constitutes his manuscript-the painting or the sculpture. The different methods of payment may reduce the apparent discrimination. An author who sells 50,000 copies of a novel and who receives a royalty of 30 cents per copy obtains $15,000 as the copyright reward for his work over the period during which the books are sold. An artist of the same class as an author selling 50,000 copies may not sell a major canvas for more than $5000 but the money is usually immediately available. Even though he does not have the right to a portion of the proceeds on resale unless he contracts for it, he can obtain interest on the price paid for the painting. Thus, a painter who sells a painting for $5000 today is as well rewarded as an author who must take ten years to obtain twice that sum through royalties. Of course, a major source of potential revenue for authors are such subsidiary rights as motion pictures and television. It is hard to envision an equivalent source for artists and sculptors.
Finally, it is difficult to assess the real effect of discrimination by the federal copyright statute without determining the impact of other federal statutes on artists and authors, For example, the tax code may tend to favor painters and sculptors over authors. Painters and sculptors, with more recognizable objects to manipulate, may have greater power than authors to arrange expenses and charitable deductions to minimize their income taxes.
A better understanding of the problem of assessing the relative discriminatory effect of the federal copyright statute may be achieved by considering the statute as a taxing device which delegates authority to impose a private tax on the sale of various items that fall within the coverage of the law. Authors, like governors of a Roman province, are authorized to tax purchasers of books in the amount of the royalty that they exact from the publisher. Each purchaser-reader must pay a certain amount of tribute to the author. Those who have a rich province do well; those who do not, do poorly. It may be true that the Copyright Statute does not specifically authorize artists to engage in the same kind of taxing process and it may be that the droit de suite would provide a technique for artists to obtain equivalent rewards, the same provincial spoils; but that is only the beginning of the inquiry. For example, assuming that a governmentally endorsed tax should be imposed upon purchaserusers of paintings and sculpture as well as buyers of books, it does not necessarily follow that the proceeds of the tax should go to the particular authors or artists who created the works. Moreover, if there is a need for tax, it is not at all clear that the best government policy is to tax the users, as if they were automobile owners paying for the construction of more freeways. Whether authors obtain 'more' bounty from the government than artists and what sort of corrective action is needed require more subtle analysis.
C . The droit de suite and the problem of resales
Even if there is discrimination in the federal legislative scheme which sharply hurts artists and sculptors, it is still questionable whether the artproceeds right is the correct way of righting the injustice. As a technique for providing economic security for artists, the droit de suite suffers from a fatal dependence on the resale of works of art. The droit de suite model assumes that works of art change hands rapidly enough to benefit painters who are still living or have been dead for a period shorter than the copyright term. If works of art do not move with some frequency from owner to owner, then the art proceeds right would be a waste of legislative energy.
Unfortunately, little is known about the rate at which paintings change hands. Apparently the likelihood that a painting or sculpture will change hands within the copyright period is relatively small. Moreover, if gift transactions and, as in Italy, non-profit sales are not counted for droit de suite purposes, the likelihood is even smaller. An attempt was made through the use of Art Prices Annual to determine what percentage of artists whose works were sold at major auction houses in the United States and Europe were living at the time of sale or had died within fifty years of the transaction. The data suggests that an art-proceeds right would benefit no more than 34 per cent of the artists (or their heirs) whose works were sold in any year.
An attempt was made to correct the more outLtanding deficiencies of the Art Prices Annual sample by obtaining information from American dealers and businesses selling contemporary paintings and sculptures predominantly by non-auction techniques. The information received suggests that the gallery resale market is limited for the works of contemporary American artists. If the function of the art-proceeds right is to compensate living and recently deceased American artists, then the slim resale market has to be cut again to determine the relevant dollar volume attributable to sales of their art works alone. In sum, the results of interviews and questionnaires suggest that the resale market is not a large one, that most purchasers do not buy predominantly for investment purposes and that works of art pass by inheritance or from collections into museums. If they are sold, they are normally sold at the death of the owner after a rather long period of holding.
Thus there is good reason to believe that the assumptions underlying the droit de suite, based as they are on romantic nineteenth-century notions about the artist in society, are not valid in the United States. As a consequence, the charitable motive for an art proceeds right loses something of its emotional strength. This is not to say that young artists are prosperous or that excellence is immediately appreciated but that several factors have changed the relationship between the artist and society in a way which makes an art proceeds-right less necessary. The 'discovery' of the impressionists and post-impressionists in the early twentieth century has altered patterns of acquisition by individuals and museums. Partly as a result of the surge in values in the late nineteenth-century non-academic work, collectors, galleries and museums have hedged against the future by buying works of artists when they are less well-known and less expensive. This hedging operation has created a greater market for the lesser-known auant-garde artist, thus leveling out the prices for his work over his lifetime. The droit de suite pretends that true value is 'discovered' rather than the partial result of fashion. At one time (perhaps in 1920) the droit de suite could have been viewed as a pension plan, welfare fund and legacy for artists and their families, who, unlike the middle class, could not be counted on to set aside savings for a rainy day. The artist's work would appreciate as the artist grew more in need of welfare: the droit de suite could be his salvation. In the United States, however, the sales of multiples, drawings, studies and versions, and the increased acceptance of reproductions as art provide painters and sculptors with a means for profiting from the appreciation in value of their work that appears to be more effective than an art proceeds right. In addition, the poor resale market in America suggests that an art proceeds right would be of little benefit to the painter or sculptor. Only where the object created is subject to multiple transactions will the art proceeds right return a benefit to the artist. Even if the model werc applicable to some portion of the American art market, its value is undercut by the probable insignificance of most of the proceeds and the problems of collection.
JII. SOME GUIDES FOR ALTERNATIVES
The basic goal of the art-proceeds right is to provide greater economic security for painters and sculptors in an equitable manner; the droit de suit concept does not perform this function adequately.
As a prominent French art critic (who wished to remain anonymous) has recently said: 'The artists or artists' families who really need to be helped do not sell or sell at low prices and therefore do not receive any funds from the droit de suite'. What is needed instead are some governmental policies more suited to the modem art market. The analysis and suggestions which follow are based on several personal but not excessively controversial assumptions which seem to me to be appropriate guides for developing legislative alternatives : (1) the working of the market place should be improved so that voluntary action rather than continuous government intervention will produce the desired results; (2) legislative policies are better if more rather than fewer citizens are benefited; (3) cost and administrative convenience are significant considerations and (4) legislation should disorder existing arrangements as little as possible. The droit de suite has been criticized on all these grounds. It is cumbersome and requires an expensive enforcement bureaucracy; it is perceived as an effect on the international art market and it is not particularly rational in bestowing rewards. It will be worthwhile to examine some aspects of the guidelines as applied to the relationships between artists and dealers and museums.
A. Subsidies for artists
Federal assistance for artists may be warranted because of the distribution of cost burdens in the art market. If it turns out that artists are the biggest contributors to museums, that artists pay out of their own meager hides for the education of the public, that artists have to support dealers and that artists subsidize catalogues and other books on art, some governmental action might be necessary to change the situation. Dealers, museums, book publishers and others spend a great deal of time emphasizing their self-sacrificing services. They suggest that a large share of their costs are attributable to the exhibitions they offer the public at little or no charge and that if the public paid its way, a substantially higher entrance fee would have to be charged. Museums, like universities comparing tuition charged to actual cost of educating a student, make much of these 'free' exhibitions they provide the public and artists.
In actual fact, a substantial part of the costs of exhibitions may be borne by the artist, not the dealer or the museum. When there is a one-man show at a gallery, the artist often absorbs the cost of publicity, framing, hanging and opening-night festivities; in fact, he may be charged a fee which includes an aliquot portion of the rent. The dealer contributes his space and other fixed costs. The artist, of course, furnishes the art work. In the case of a museum exhibition, the costs which the artist absorbs are not so obvious. But a feature exhibition, such as the recent 'Sculpture of the Sixties' show at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, illustrates the point. About fifty living sculptors took part in the show, some absorbing the expense of creating an object precisely for the exhibition. The show, for the most part, was held in the enclosed Lytton Gallery with all viewers, except museum members, paying an extra fee to see the special exhibit. It was clear that the viewers were coming to see that particular show and were willing to pay a certain fee to see it. The proceeds went entirely to the museum. Similarly, the catalogue, which enjoyed a brisk sale, benefited only the museum in the immediate financial sense. Where the artist could bargain for a portion of the proceeds but does not, he is also making a contribution to the museum. If Jackson Pollock's family said that they would only allow his retrospective to appear at various museums if they received 10 per cent of all proceeds, the museum directorate would probably accede. The price of admission would be raised or the museum would be required to absorb the additional expense. In either case, the subsidizing quality of the artist's contribution would be shifted. During the interviews, one museum director said proudly that the catalogue for a new one-man show would feature a special lithograph, supervised by the artist, pasted to the cover. The lithograph itself is close to being 'original' in terms of the requirements established by the Print Council. Only a limited edition will be made available. Yet, the museum is charging a mere $1.50 for the catalogue and predicting that there will be a substantial loss. It has not made any market study of what price the catalogue could command, what difference it would make if the artist initialed the lithographs that he had supervised or what difference it would make if they paid the artist some royalty for the work he is doing. The museum considers this is a great piece of public charity on their part. It may well be. But the greatest donor is the artist.
There is a substantial additional cost in the process of distributing and exhibiting which is now absorbed, by and large, by the artist. The cost cannot evaporate; it must be borne by someone. To be sure, this extra cost varies from situation to situation. And where the exhibition is clearly an investment for the artist and the investment value is increased by encouraging more people to attend through a lower or non-existent admission price, the artist, like the gallery, may jointly wish to suppressany fee. Sometimes the dealer or the museum will want a large turnout even though the artist does not: forexample, thedealer may represent an artist whose works are offered for sufficiently high prices so that the admission fee is not a barrier to entry but the dealer also has cheaper stock of other artists which he hopes to sell. Sometimes, where an aura of exclusivity is desired, both the artist and the museum or dealer may like the entrance fee to exclude the masses.
The implications for government policy are several. First, there is the need to discover what the costs are and how they are distributed. If certain costs should not be borne by the artist, there must be some technique for distributing them to others. But it is quite unusual for an artist to seek a portion of the proceeds produced by a museum show, catalogue sale or a gallery admission fee. A government could decide that it is undesirable for any of the participants directly involved to bear certain costs: it is bad for the museum because it already makes heavy demands on a narrow group of supporters; it is bad to rely on the viewing public because this will discourage visits to museums and galleries; and it is bad for the artist because he may be the participant least able to bear the cost. That leaves primarily the government. Perhaps it should bear the costs of museums or galleries which are now carried by artists. In the 'Sculpture of the Sixties' show, for example, some system might have been worked out for compensating the participants in the exhibition while passing the expense to the viewers, to the members of the museum, to the county, to the state or to the nation. At least the question should be clearly met: why are artists expected to finance such a glorious show when they should be paid for their troubles ?
Of course, the droit de suite may be viewed in part, as a technique for reimbursing the artist for his prior subsidization of the art market. To be sure, he must suffer early in his career but that is only because he has chosen a metier that requires heavy, early investment. The additional investment is returned through the proceeds right. Once the public 'understands' in the sense that it is willing to pay for his work, it compensates him for the extra investment he was required to put into exhibitions, catalogues and the free loan of his work. Unfortunately, the droit de suite so imperfectly compensates painters and sculptors that it does little to relieve most artists of the costs they must bear in exhibiting their work. Additionally, the rewards of an art-proceeds right are not distributed to artists in proportion to their expenses. A droit de suite may discourage painters who should not be discouraged; while it benefits galleries and museums that do not need to be benefited.
Second, to the extent that the droit de suite is intended to compensate the artist for society's lack of vision at the time of the first transaction, it would be better to spend money to improve society's insight. Indeed, this may be an educational function of the dealer or gallery which should be strengthened. Thus, if the government took a sum which is the equivalent of the aggregate droit de suite and invested it in an educational campaign or subsidized the efforts of dealers to promote artists, the gap in understanding which continues and lies at the basis of most notions of a droit de suite might be overcome. Such education would not only benefit the artist by securing higher prices for his work earlier in his life, it would also benefit society by insuring earlier understanding and greater enjoyment of the art work involved. To be sure, the droit de suite sum might not be enough but the fruits of such an enterprise would probably be greater than the fruits of a droit de suite.
B. Private bargaining
In other areas of regulation where income distribution has been found inequitable, government policy has often aimed at strengthening bargaining power rather than intervening in specific transactions. It may be that such an approach is totally out of the question in the art market but it is certainly worth some scrutiny. Private bargaining does not require an elaborate rationale; if an artist arranges for additional future compensation by contract, he does not have to say it is 'just' or 'necessary' or 'encourages the arts'. Private contractual arrangements, indeed, are the normal method for fashioning patterns and levels of financial reward. It is perfectly justifiable for artists, like television personalities, to obtain residuals in their works. It is perfectly justifiable for artists, like motion picture producers, to tax each subsequent use of a print or a painting. But because symmetry is desirable it does not mean that the government should impose it. Government legislation might be directed at ways of improving the possibility that fair, voluntary bargaining takes place. This may be a matter of merely furnishing information; it may be a matter of less subtle techniques of intervention.
What is immediately clear from a survey of present arrangements in the United States is that extremely few artists have written contracts of sale or consignment and it is not much of an exaggeration to say that virtually no contract includes a specific art proceeds right term. While this may be the result of a legal incapacity, artists offer several other reasons. The first is the strong influence of custom or contractual arrangements in the sale of art. It is a business that in many ways tries not to be a business (at least so far as the artist-dealer relationship is concerned). There are negotiations about certain issues: what will be the amount of commission, whether the artist is paid a monthly advance or works on an output contract, who pays for framing, the dealer's publicity costs, opening costs and hanging costs. There may even be loose consensus on the amount of the selling price but the sort of purchaser and the terms of the contract of sale are normally outside the artist-dealer negotiations. The negotiations often do not relate at all to the most important aspects of the transactions. The artist has a vital interest in where his paintings are placed and what use is made of the work after it is sold but these terms are rarely bargained over.
Because of the strong influence of custom in the contractual practices of the parties, very few artists have given consideration to fashioning different arrangements with their dealers or ultimate customers. The pervasive impact of existing practices gives rise to various theologies for the lack of change. First, although it is a popular pastime for artists to complain about their dealers, they do not normally conceive of the need for intermediaries between them and the dealers. An analogy from the motion picture industry is apt: a show business personality does not depend on his producer or exhibitor to look out for his or her best interests; he hires an agent who negotiates the contract for exhibition. The agent tests the market for flexibility in various aspects of the producer-personality arrangement, bargains for better billing, for a different form of compensation and for artistic control over the end product. He is able to force the producer to differentiate among the various performers he employs. For better or for worse, the art dealer performs the role of exhibitor and agent. He may have short or long range interests that are different from and even conflict with those of the artist; he may be less concerned than the artist would be with increasing the artist's control over the use and disposition of a work of art that has left the dealer through a sales transaction. From enforcing the art proceeds right and coping with the sales resistance it creates, only headaches result for the dealer. Similarly, any conditions imposed on the sale which lead to limitations on usage or requirements of display restrict the market.
A second theology relates to the 'power' of artists. Many of the participants in the process think that artists and sculptors could not get changes in their arrangements even if they so desired. As a consequence, they give little thought to the form change might take. The prophecy of powerlessness is self-fulfilling. The various movements, dating from New Deal days in the 1930s and still lingering in the shape of the artists cooperative associations, have exceedingly little force in the market place. Indeed, the feeling of powerlessness extends to the point where even powerful individual artists do not exercise their strength, although it appears that they could exact such benefits as an art-proceeds right, reproduction rights, exhibition rights and others. One major dealer of mass art in Los Angeles exacts an agreement from purchasers that he retains the right to reproduce. Often, after a painting is sold, it is recalled, photographed and made the subject of thousands of 'prints' for interior decorators. Neither the purchaser nor the artist participates in the proceeds.
There seems to be no recorded instance of collective action which has changed the policies of a dealer, gallery or local market. The attempts to exercise power have either been on an individual basis or on a mass basis, like the Artists Equity movement. Part of the reason is that a large number of artists, including artists that have a certain reputation and power in the market, have only a fragmented idea of the sorts of matters they could negotiate about with their dealers. And even if the art proceeds right became a matter of negotiation, it would almost certainly be in the context of other sorts of contractual provisions which would furnish a spectrum of techniques for enhancing the economic security of the artist and the dealer.
The range of issues which are or could be subjects for negotiation is quite large. The most obvious is reproduction rights. To the degree that the receipt of royalties makes a painter more like a n author, such rights are a supplement of the droit de suite. Under American law, except in New York, the sale of the object carries with it the sale of the common law copyright unless the copyright is expressly retained. That simple action of retaining the copyright is taken by extremely few artists and dealers. In some cases, the dealer retains the copyright allowing him to make reproductions in the future without compensating the artist. There is some indication that museums would resist purchasing objects without purchasing copyrights but such resistance would probably crumble in the face of demands by artists for their copyright rights. Much is made of the inconvenience that attends retained reproduction rights. One way out is the method employed by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)-policing public performances of music; however, this is extremely expensive and would be suitable for artists only when reproductions become widespread and policing worth the cost. Other methods are less burdensome. For example, it is contended that retention of reproduction rights would create too much bother and confusion for people who wanted to reproduce the painting. But even now the reproducer must check with someone, normally the owner of the painting or the museum before he copies the work. Museums normally require that the reproducer establish a credit line as do collectors, although museums often waive any charge. An artist could require that the museum collect a certain fee for reproduction, perhaps geared to the size of the publication. At first, until it is clear how such a system would work, the artist could relieve the private collector or the museum from liability for non-collection of the royalty, leaving the arrangement up to the bona Jides of the owner of the painting.
Other subjects for bargaining include dealer practices. The way in which the dealer deploys his budget has serious consequences for the artist. Changes in the advertising budget, the decision to keep a gallery open, the guarantee of exhibition, the turnover in shows-freedom in all these respects is permitted the dealer because he maintains his stock without strings. Few other dealers who have exclusive arrangements with suppliers can act with such immunity from suppliers' actions. When an artist agrees to be represented exclusively by a gallery he makes certain assumptions which might be articulated and made explicit in a contract for representation: for example, that there will be a maintenance of the existing advertising budget or that it will increase at a certain percentage each year. Also, there could be a guarantee to certain artists who are represented that there will be one-man shows each 12 months and gallery group shows once a year. Two frequent complaints are that artists lose track of their work or fear that the gallery will be slow to pay them. Certain contractual techniques might alleviate these complaints. Artists could require that the gallery maintain, in an accessible place and at the gallery's expense, a registry of all work on hand by artists. This central file would be open to the artist for his inspection at set times. Artists could also require that a penalty clause be inserted which would add 5 per cent to the monies due for each three month delay in submitting payment.
The art-proceeds right concentrates on the immediate financial interest an artist has in the fate of his work. But various non-financial controls may be more important to the artist's welfare. For example, an artist has a great stake in the manner his work is displayed by the dealer. At present, the dealer usually has complete discretion over the placement of paintings within the gallery. If the gallery does not have shows, or reserves a section of the gallery for selections from artists represented, some assurance can be built into the contract that there be regular display of each artist's work of art. The artist may also bargain for billing in circulars and on-site promotional material. Furthermore, the artist may require the dealer to impose certain exhibition obligations on the purchaser, such as making the works available for display in museum shows. The artist might demand the right to limit the number of times a painting could be loaned and the duration of each loan. The artist might wish to exercise some censorship over the occasions on which his work is exhibited; there are related rights similar to the 'moral rights' which exist in France and many other countries. The artist may wish to exercise contractual control over modifications of the work of art, such as changing its colors so that it will be a better match for the owner's furniture and wallpaper. The artist may seek contractual assurance that the purchaser will not mutilate or destroy the painting or that the purchaser will adequately protect the work, periodically relining it, for example, or the artist may even demand that the work be destroyed in a certain number of years.
Clearly, one of the harshest blows for artists occurs when a gallery decides to close. The artist may wish to protect himself by obtaining some assurance in his contract with the dealer that the gallery will continue to operate. For the artist, the choice of dealer is extremely important; his tie to one agent forecloses other arrangements. He becomes closely identified with a certain market and certain purchasers. For him, the dealer's decision to close can be quite cruel. What protection is there? First, there ought to be a notice requirement. A contract could provide that a dealer must give at least three months notice before he closes up shop. This would give the artists involved some opportunity to persuade the dealer to change his mind, to encourage some quick additional financing or to make other arrangements. Second, the artists may have some interest in the liquidation of the gallery's assets. In a sense, the artists have become quasi-partners ; their continuous subsidy and investments in frames, materials, etc. have been a substantial factor in the gallery's financing. The artists may have considerable interest in the mailing list of the gallery and other records that may permit them to continue the business. They certainly have an interest in their paintings and in the gallery's accounts receivable, at least to the extent that their commissions depend on the monthly instalment payments by the purchasers of their paintings. In sum, the contract with the gallery can provide for rights on liquidation. Because of custom, lack of experience and a feeling of powerlessness, private contractual techniques for future participation in the increase in value in a work of art has not yet been adequately tested.
The implications for government action of this absence of contractual arrangement are by no means clear. Were the art-proceeds right felt to be crucial to provide fair and just compensation, then the government might feel it necessary to intervene whatever the reasons for the failure of private bargaining. Government intervention would be more compelling if present contract law forbade artists from obtaining provisions that would improve their economic security. For example, certain provisions which bind future purchasers could be held to violate the rule against perpetuities or could be characterized as 'against public policy', enforcement of certain provisions might violate various anitrust laws. Finally, even if such contracts were valid, the government might be required to intervene because enforcement was impossible without outside assistance.
It is difficult to believe that the ingenuity of lawyers cannot surmount the problems surrounding the drafting of a private art proceeds right. To be sure, there are the hobgoblins of restraints on alienation but they should be spurs, not obstacles, to the lawyer's imagination. For example, the artist could make his sale partially conditional; $20,000 cash with $5000 more to be paid if the buyer ever sells the painting for $40,000 or more. Or the painter could sell the painting with a $2000 lien, with payment due at the time of the first resale. As to the first purchaser, the artist certainly has adequate privity to require an out-and-out droit de suite. The artist can include in the contract of sale a stipulation that he receive 3 per cent of the proceeds of any sale. Problems, such as lack of privity, arise primarily on subsequent sales. A continuing restraint on the sale may violate the rule against perpetuities and certainly would be difficult to enforce. There are methods for solving this problem but they may be so difficult and unworkable that they are no solutions at all. For example, an artist may relinquish his painting in a lease rather than sale form. The lessee would have a continuing lease but would not be able to sell the painting without the painter's permission. The lessee would be able to give the work to a museum without obligation to the artist but as to any other transaction, the painting would have to be rerouted to its creator or his estate. Or the painter could have an option to repurchase: a cloud on the ownership of the work which could only be dispelled by paying him a sum which would be similar to the droit de suite. To make the arrangement more palatable the artist's lien could be set at 10 per cent of the increase in the painting's value, if the transaction involves more than $2000. Under these circumstances, the purchaser would probably not be deterred for fear of losing his original investment, since he reaps 90 per cent of all profits which he makes on his investment.
The problem of policing is still a nagging one. Again, there must be an element of trust and selfenforcement. The contract could stipulate where the proceeds should be sent. If a purchaser fails to pay, the artist would have a lien on the painting for the amount of the art proceeds right. Where a gift to a museum was made, the artist could agree to take half the normal share due him or waive the proceeds entirely. Government intervention to enforce the art-proceeds right might be warranted, if artists could negotiate clauses giving them such a right but had no way to collect the money when their work hit the Top Ten. Existing private models for enforcement, such as ASCAP, are probably too bulky and expensive for artists. Indeed, a close study of the French experience would probably indicate that the ASCAPtype agencies which were employed to enforce the artists' rights created a substantial drain on the income from the droit de suite.
IV. CONCLUSION
What do these changes in style and the marketing of art imply for government policy? First and most important, there is a need for vast improvement in the operation of the market place. The artist, ignorant of his rights, saddled with the concept of powerlessness, has by no means explored the limits of his contractual arrangements with dealer and purchaser. The government can play a crucial role in eliminating this informational gap. Some governmental agency, perhaps the National Endowment on the Arts, should provide technical assistance to artists and sculptors. Such technical assistance would include information about the income taxin particular allowable deductions-information about new materials and new processes, information about the great variety of bargaining relationships among artists and dealers, information about firms that would reproduce their art and information about new markets for works of art.
Second, the government should expand the market for works of art, particularly contemporary American paintings and sculpture. The government can do this by increasing its own purchases of art or increasing, by regulation, the investment in works of art by others. The program of purchasing American art for embassies abroad might be extended to federal offices in this country. The policy of requiring a small percentage of public construction funds to be spent on murals, paintings and sculpture should be more rigorously fostered and administered. Greater federal encouragement, particularly through the State Commissions on the Arts, should yield increased buying of contemporary works by state and municipal governments. The National Endowment on the Arts can encourage more elaborate aesthetic zoning, more parks and public places with room for sculpture gardens, better tax breaks for office buildings which are exemplars of good, rather than horrid, taste.
The government can also continue to increase the market for art by fostering public higher education, thus expanding the number of citizens who become potential buyers of contemporary art.
Third, the National Endowment on the Arts should explore in great depth the way in which the private art market presently functions and how current trends may modify the income patterns of various schools of American artists. More information is necessary about who the new purchasers are; whether individual collectors, corporate collectors or museums predominate; what is the extent of the market for paintings at various price levels and what is the capability of the dealers to ferret out new markets for the artists they represent.
Fourth, the government should explore and develop new avenues of participation for artists in architecture and city planning so that novel forms of creative expression have compensating outlets. In part this may involve subsidizing production facilities which require extraordinary capital outlays.
The droit de suite cannot function as the corner stone of federal planning. The fashioning of government policy in the area of the arts is difficult enough without the additional paralysis of reliance on out-moded ideas of the production and distribution of art. The rude intrusion of technology into the craft of the parlor and the rampant extension of the artistic imagination is rendering obsolete such notions as 'paintings', 'originals', 'authentic'.
The shape of the demand profile is also changing. The practices of periodic resales and passing works of art from generation to generation are growing less significant as institutional, government and corporate buying begin to become a greater proportion of the market. The pervasive idea of distinguishing between books and paintings must fade somewhat as the market for reproductions doubles and redoubles.
What is most clear is that the government cannot define its policy on the basis of a nineteenth-century view-or any fixed view-of the art market at a time when standards, styles and methods of sale are so quickly changing. That is the plague of the droit de suite. True, it offers a small solution to the problems of some painters. Yet the administrative problems it produces would probably outweigh its benefits and the government could better direct its energy in channels calculated to improve the economic security of the artist. In terms of its articulated goals, the droit de suite rewards the wrong painters with probably inconsequential amounts of money at the wrong time in their lives. 
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